Rules, judgment and mechanisation

Authors

  • Mazviita Chirimuuta University of Edinburgh

Keywords:

philosophy of AI, cognitivism, legal judgment, automation, history of AI

Abstract

This paper is a philosophical exploration of the notion of judgment, a mode of reasoning that has a central role in legal practice as it currently stands. The first part considers the distinction proposed by Kant, and recently explored historically by Lorraine Daston, between the capacity to follow and execute rules and the capacity to determine whether a general rule applies to a particular situation (that is, judgment). This characterisation of judgment is compared with one proposed by Brian Cantwell Smith, as part of an argument that current AI technologies do not have judgment. The second part of the paper asks whether digital computers could in principle have judgment and concludes with a negative answer.

Reply by William Lucy, University of Durham.

Author Biography

Mazviita Chirimuuta, University of Edinburgh

 

 

Downloads

Published

9 February 2023
Total downloads
278

How to Cite

Chirimuuta, Mazviita. 2023. “Rules, Judgment and Mechanisation”. Journal of Cross-Disciplinary Research in Computational Law 1 (3). https://journalcrcl.org/crcl/article/view/22.